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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Law Commission ("ILC") submitted draft articles on The
Law of Transboundary Aquifers to the United Nations General Assembly
("General Assembly") in August 2008.' The ILC recommended that the General
Assembly take note of the Draft Articles, that states use the Draft Articles in the
preparation of bilateral and multilateral aquifer agreements, and that the General
Assembly consider "at a later stage" the preparation of a convention on the Law
* Copyright © 2008. Margaret J. Vick is an Associate to the Pacific McGeorge Institute for Sustainable
Development and is a JSD candidate at Pacific McGeorge School of Law. She resides in Tempe, Arizona where
she is a water law consultant working primarily with Native American tribes. She may be contacted at
mjvick@pacific.edu.
1. Report of the International Low Commission, 1$ 46-49, A/63/10 [hereinafter 2008 Report of the
International Law Commission], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2008/2008 report.htm. The Draft
Articles that appear at paragraph 53 of this Report will be referred to hereinafter as the "2008 Draft Articles."
The Draft Articles also appear in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
GAOR 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, 75, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Report of the International
Law Commission]. The Draft Articles that appear at paragraph 75 will be referred to as the "2006 Draft
Articles."
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of Transboundary Aquifers.2 The Draft Articles consist of nineteen Articles
organized into four Parts: Introduction; General Principles; Protection;
Preservation and Management; and Miscellaneous Provisions.' The consideration
of the law of transboundary aquifers was taken up by the ILC as part of their
consideration of the topic "shared natural resources." The members of the ILC
discussed what resources fit within this topic and considered migratory birds, oil
and natural gas, and groundwater. Settling on the latter two, oil and gas and
groundwater, the members decided to take up the less contentious topic of
groundwater under the heading of aquifers.'
During the consideration of this topic, the ILC had the benefit of
presentations from global experts including several U.N. agencies.6 The structure
and the provisions of the Draft Articles track those of the 1997 U.N. Convention,
but have been modified to address particular concerns regarding how the Articles
would affect aquifers differently from surface waters. Each of the articles is
discussed in some detail by Eckstein in his article Commentary on the U.N.
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers Flavia Loures and Joseph Delapenna also discuss many of the
proposed articles and suggest changes that would provide more ecosystem
protections in their article, Forthcoming Developments in International
Groundwater Law: Proposals for the Way Ahead.8
This article questions whether a new international convention is needed to
address utilization of international/transboundary freshwater resources. The
article also examines the inclusion of Draft Article 3, Sovereignty of Aquifer
States, when sovereignty was a concept repudiated by the ILC during the
development of the 1997 Convention on the Law of International Watercourses.9
The author does not question the importance of aquifers to the world water
supply, nor the grave need for protection of this vital resource. The question
raised in this article is whether a second international instrument for
international/transboundary freshwaters is the most effective path to achieve
optimal utilization, protection from pollution, and sustainability of freshwaters.
2. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 1, 49.
3. Id. 153.
4. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 1, 76.
5. Id. 9 76(2).
6. Id. 974.
7. Gabriel E. Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the
Law of Transboundar Aquifers, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 537 (2007) [hereinafter Eckstein 2007].
8. Flavia Loures & Joseph Dellapenna, Forthcoming Developments in International Groundwater Law:
Proposals for the Way Ahead, WATER 21, Aug. 2007, at 58, available at www.iwapublishing.com/pdf/W2 I Aug
07%20groundwaterlaw.pdf.
9. See Stephen M. Schwebel, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, 1 45 A/CN.4/348 (Dec. 1, 1981) [hereinafter Schwebel, Third Report]; and
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, 1 165, A/CN.4/399 (Mar. 19, 1986 and May 12, 21, 1986) [hereinafter McCaffrey,
Second Report].
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After a brief discussion of freshwaters, Part II reviews the law of
international freshwaters as codified in the 1997 U.N. Convention and set forth in
the Draft Articles. This Part examines the concepts of bifurcation of freshwater
into surface waters and aquifers, and discusses the further fragmentation of
international law that may be caused by having two instruments that cover the
same resource. Part III focuses on Draft Article 3 and the concepts of sovereignty
over freshwaters. Part IV uses the century old dispute between the states of
Colorado and Kansas over the Arkansas River'0 to provide perspective on the
management of surface water and groundwater with one legal regime. This final
Part also discusses the strong influence that the concept of "sovereignty" asserts
on governments, even when those influences may be contrary to law.
This article concludes with a recommendation that the law of international
freshwater will be better served by one international legal regime, the 1997 U.N.
Convention. Instead of adopting the new standards embodied in the Draft
Articles, a protocol should be added that contains only those provisions necessary
to bring all international freshwaters within the scope of the Convention.
II. FRESHWATERS: GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER
It is difficult to make a legal distinction between groundwater and surface
water. A given set of water molecules may fall as rain, become soil moisture,
exist as groundwater and then flow on the surface before evaporating or
transpiring as water vapor. " "Use of soil moisture diminishes the availability of
groundwater; use of groundwater diminishes the availability of surface water, etc.
Any use of water, unlike any other natural resources, affects the entire water
cycle."' 2
Groundwaters, surface waters, and watercourses are all freshwaters flowing
in interconnected systems. When the law attempts to create separate regimes for
water that we can see (surface water) and water that we cannot see
(groundwater), it ignores the natural cycle and prevents integrated, efficient, and
optimal management.
Granted, the portion of the hydrologic cycle that is out of sight is much more
difficult to study; this limits the information available on global groundwater
resources.'3 Regional and local information is often inaccessible for use on a
global scale, and the lack of this information limits assessments of global
groundwater resources. In addition, the amount of water extracted from aquifers
10. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 386-388 (1943).
11. MALIN FALKENMARK & JOHAN ROCKSTROM, BALANCING WATER FOR HUMANS AND NATURE, THE
NEW APPROACH TO ECOHYDROLOGY 208 (Earthscan 2004).
12. Id.
13. The U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recently published a map
entitled "Groundwater Resources of the World, Transboundary Aquifer Systems," available at http://unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0014/001466/146644e.pdf.
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is usually not quantified. Aquifer boundaries, the volume of water within, and the
amount and rate of withdrawal are rarely known with any degree of certainty
before ecological harm occurs."
The lack of data regarding global aquifers and groundwater resources
complicates analysis, but it does not diminish the need for legal regimes and
management strategies. In 2005, the status of groundwater extraction was
described as follows:
Groundwater pumping is among the largest human-induced changes in
the hydrological cycle, leading to changes in water levels, the residence
times of water in aquifers, and water quality .... The environmental
contributions [groundwater] makes to stream base flows, wetlands, and
surface vegetation are masked and.., impossible to observe directly....
[I]n many areas, over-abstraction is severe and groundwater water levels
15are declining at rates that range from 1 to 3 meters per year ....
Groundwater is critical to meet global freshwater demand. It is estimated that
groundwater makes up ninety-eight percent of the global freshwater that is not in
polar ice caps and glaciers.16 Its availability in remote locations, in addition to its
relatively better quality, increases its importance at a local level. It is estimated
that groundwater provides fifty percent or more of the global potable water
supplies.
17
[T]he value of groundwater to society should not be gauged solely in
terms of relative volumetric abstraction. Compared with surface water,
groundwater use often brings large economic benefits per unit volume,
because of ready local availability, high drought reliability and generally
good quality requiring minimal treatment .... The dependence of
expanding cities and innumerable medium-sized towns on groundwater
is intensifying, such that it is believed some 1500 million urban dwellers
worldwide depend on well, bore-hole and spring sources."
14. Marcus Moench, Groundwater: The Challenge of Monitoring and Management, in THE WORLD'S
WATER 2004-2005, THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES, 79, 81 (Island Press 2004). For
example, the state of California, known for its extensive water management programs, released the first state-
wide assessment of groundwater resources in 2003 having left groundwater management to local authorities. Id.
at 81 (citing CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 118-03 CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER
(2003)).
15. Id. at 79.
16. S.S.D. Foster & P.J. Chilton, Groundwater. The Processes and Global Significance of Aquifer
Degradation, 358 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC'y LONDON B 1957, 1957 (2003),
available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid= 1693287&blobtype=pdf.
17. Id. at 1958.
18. id.
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Groundwater studies that aim to accurately determine aquifer boundaries,
water quantity in storage, natural inflow, natural discharge and human
withdrawals are technically difficult and expensive. The limited availability of
this information limits the effectiveness of groundwater management.' 9
The Draft Articles are the first international instrument to address only
groundwater. The law of international freshwaters developed primarily in relation
to surface waters. However, jurists,0 scholars, and the ILC agree that the
principles apply to all international freshwaters.
III. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL FRESH WATERS
This section discusses international freshwater law. It begins in part A by
setting out the customary international law of non-navigational use of
freshwaters, as codified in the 1997 U.N. Convention, and the waters to which
the Convention pertains. This is followed in part B by a discussion of the Draft
Articles, and the overlap of waters included in the two instruments. The legal
analysis turns in Part B.1 to the interconnectedness of the hydrologic cycle with a
look at the legal and ecological problems within jurisdictions that maintain
different laws for groundwater and surface water. Part B.2 moves away from
water law to look at the further fragmentation of international law that may result
if the ILC recommends that the Draft Articles be considered as a second
convention for international freshwaters. The discussion of the Draft Articles
concludes in part B.3 with an analysis of the similarities and differences between
"groundwaters" and "aquifers."
The principles of international water law are flexible and adaptive to
different watercourses and to changing conditions within a watercourse.
McCaffrey summarizes these principles as follows:
1. Equitable and reasonable utilization: Shared water must be used in a
manner that is equitable and reasonable vis-a-vis co-riparian states.
What is 'equitable and reasonable utilization' is determined case-by-
case, taking into consideration all relevant factors based upon both
natural and human-related phenomena.
2. Prevention of significant harm: Countries must do their best to
prevent uses within their territories from causing significant harm to
other states.
[This is] [p]robably [the] most controversial issue in international
water law-[the] relationship between equitable utilization and
prevention of significant harm. The UN Convention seems to suggest
19. See Moench, supra note 14, at 95 (discussing the technical difficulties in the state of Colorado,
which separates water in the ground that is tributary to surface water and is governed by surface water law from
water in the ground that is non-tributary).
20. See, e.g., Gabc-kovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
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that one state's use can cause some harm to another state and still be
justified as equitable.
3. Prior notification: [A] state must notify other states of planned
activities that may adversely affect those other states. Potentially
affected states must be permitted to comment on and consult with the
notifying state concerning the plans."
The factors examined to determine "equitable and reasonable utilization"
take into consideration natural phenomena and the circumstances of the water
use. 22 Though the factors examined to determine the reasonableness of the use
vary depending on the location (ground or surface) and the use made of that
water, the principles remain the same. A new instrument such as the Draft
Articles is not necessary to articulate different circumstances for utilization of the
same principles, because the current principles under the 1997 U.N. Convention
are flexible enough to accomplish this.
The following sections look at the overlapping scope of the 1997 U.N.
Convention and the Draft Articles. Those sections highlight the difficulties of
managing freshwater when it is bifurcated into the two separate systems of
groundwater and surface water.
A. Scope of the1997 U.N. Convention
During the 20 years of work on the law of non-navigational uses of
international watercourses, the ILC left the drafting of provisions regarding scope
of the convention until the end. 23 The Special Rapporteur recommended
including groundwater. However, the work of the ILC did not focus on
groundwater, and the members were reluctant to include all freshwaters within
the scope of the draft articles. There was also concern that a broader definition of
24watercourse might determine or limit land use. In particular, the ILC was
uncertain about state practice in relation to groundwater. 2  The term
"international watercourse" was used from the start, 26 and the later debates
focused on the clause "flowing into a common terminus."
21. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Establishing Rights-The Law of International Waters, in SHARING WATER,
SHARING BENEFITS: WORKING TOWARDS EFFECTIVE TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
(Aaron T. Wolf ed., forthcoming 2009) (emphasis in original).
22. For lists of non-exclusive factors, see U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/869, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700, art. 6
[hereinafter 1997 U.N. Convention], and 2006 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5.
23. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/436/Corr. 1-3 (1991) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Seventh
Report].
24. See Eckstein 2007, supra note 7, at 586 (this remains an issue in regard to aquifers and their recharge
zones).
25. McCaffrey, Seventh Report, supra note 23.
26. G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 1970).
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This was resolved with the addition of the modifier "normally" which
resulted in the following definitions which are sufficiently broad to include most
freshwaters:
'Watercourse' means a system of surface waters and groundwaters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and
normally flowing into a common terminus.27
'International watercourse' means a watercourse, parts of which are
situated in different States.28
The obvious exclusion from this definition is freshwater located in confined
aquifers, not hydraulically connected to an international watercourse. This is
29
addressed in the ILC Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater,
which acknowledges that "groundwater not related to an international
watercourse, is also a natural resource of vital importance for sustaining life,
health and the integrity of ecosystems."30 That resolution also recognized that
there is a "need for continuing efforts to elaborate rules pertaining to confined
transboundary groundwater."3 ' The Resolution goes on to state that the ILC
considered the "principles contained in [the] draft articles on the law of the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses [applicable] to transboundary
confined groundwater. 32 The ILC recommended that states be guided by these
principles, that states enter agreements regarding transboundary groundwater,
and that disputes be resolved using the provisions of what became Article 33 of
the 1997 U.N. Convention.33
With this resolution, the law of the non-navigational uses of international
freshwater is theoretically complete. If waters are not included in the definition
of "watercourse," or within this Resolution on Confined Transboundary
Groundwater, the legal principles from the 1997 U.N. Convention still apply.34
B. Scope of the Draft Articles
Like the 1997 Convention, the Draft Articles also contain an expansive scope
of included waters. Article 2 states that an "'aquifer' is a permeable water-
27. 1997 U.N. Convention, supra note 22, art. 2(a).
28. Id. art. 2(b).
29. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 135 [hereinafter 1994 Report of the International
Law Commission].
30. Id. at pmbl.
31. Id.
32. 1994 Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. See Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 20.
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bearing underground geological formation underlain by a less permeable layer
and the water contained in the saturated zone of the formation."35 An "'aquifer
system' means a series of two or more aquifers that are hydraulically
connected.,, 3' A "transboundary aquifer," or a "transboundary aquifer system," is
an aquifer "parts of which are situated in different states.
An "aquifer" is defined, for purposes of the Draft Articles, as including the
water within the saturated zone of an underground formation.38 In some
formations this will include groundwaters which "by virtue of their physical
relationship" to surface waters constitute the "unitary whole" of an international
watercourse. 39 Therefore, the same water may, at the same time and in the same
location, be included within the scope of both the 1997 U.N. Convention and the
Draft Articles.
Koskenniemi, a former member of the ILC, criticizes both the 1997 U.N.
Convention and the Draft Articles as technical regime-building documents. 4° He
concludes that a state which is a party to such a technical regime merely agrees to
ongoing negotiations. 4' This is necessarily true for freshwater, which fluctuates
both in the available supply and increasing demand. However, given the
continuing negotiation required by regimes based on equity, the global
freshwater resources will be best served by one regime and one set of technical
criteria that may be used as a framework and as guidance for negotiations for all
freshwaters.
1. Legal Bifurcation of Freshwaters
As discussed above, it is often technically difficult to distinguish
groundwater from surface water. The hydrologic cycle is just that-a cycle with
water flowing, seeping, springing from groundwater to surface water and
returning to groundwater. A legal system that distinguishes the water resources
based on the point of extraction has inherent difficulties. Some states within the
United States make a legal distinction between groundwater and surface water.
This results in extensive financial resources and time being spent to determine
the appropriate regime for any given water use.
The adverse consequences of bifurcated legal systems are well-documented,
but not easily remedied. "The failure to conform legal doctrine to hydrologic
reality has profound and adverse consequences for river flows and riparian
35. 2006 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 2(a).
36. Id. art. 2(b).
37. Id. art. 2(c).
38. id. art. 2(a).
39. 1997 U.N. Convention, supra note 22, art. 2(a).
40. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70
MOD. L. REV. 1, 10- 14 (2007) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, Fate of Public International Law].
41. /d.atl1 .
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habitat .... This section provides examples of the consequences a bifurcated
water law system can have on water use and water rights. The domestic state
water laws in Arizona, Colorado, California and Texas provide good examples. 3
Arizona general stream adjudications are court proceedings to determine the
relative priority of rights for surface water users. The court in these cases must decide
whether a particular use is of surface water or groundwater because the court's
jurisdiction is limited to the holders of surface water rights. It took nearly two
decades with two appeals to the state supreme court to establish a legal standard to
differentiate subflow-which is underground water legally characterized as surface
water-from other groundwaters. The legal standard adopted states that underground
water is subflow if it is within the "saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium."" The
application of this standard to particular water users is a time consuming and
expensive process, the results of which have significant consequences to each well
owner. If a use is determined to be surface water drawing from an over-appropriated
stream system, that use is subject to being shut off if the priority date is later than
others who have rights to the limited supply. If a use is determined to be
groundwater, then it is limited only by a standard of reasonable use or by the
requirements of the Arizona Groundwater Code. 5
The judicial effort to differentiate groundwater from surface water has been
ongoing in Arizona for three decades. It is reported that the development of a
protocol for the thousands of wells potentially drawing water from the "saturated
floodplain Holocene alluvium" was not final six years after the standard was
established. 46 Based on this model, determination of which wells are within the
jurisdiction of the courts will not be complete within the foreseeable future.47
The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that maintaining separate laws for
groundwater and surface water ignores science.8 That Court stated that although the
bifurcation of Arizona water law "may be based on an understanding of hydrology
less precise than current theories, it would be inappropriate to undo that which has
been done in the past.' ' 9 While this technically complex machination is taking place
within the Arizona courts, groundwater continues to be exploited with detrimental
consequences to surface flows."
42. Robert Glennon, The Disconnect between Water Law and Hydrology, in ARIZONA WATER POLICY.
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN AN URBANIZING, ARID REGION, at 106 (Bonnie G. Colby & Katharine L.
Jacobs eds., Resources for the Future 2007) [hereinafter Glennon, Water Law].
43. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S
FRESH WATERS Ch. 3-4 (2002) [hereinafter GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES].
44. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (Gila IV), 9
P.3d 1069, 1073 (Ariz. 2000).
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-401 et. seq. (1980).
46. Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 405, 424 (2007).
47. Id.
48. Gila H, 857 P.2d at 1243.
49. Id.
50. Feller, supra note 46, at 432.
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The state of Colorado also has a bifurcated system. 5' Groundwater is
classified as "tributary" or "non-tributary" to the surface system. The difficulty
lies in determining if any given well is "tributary" or "non-tributary." Marcus
Moench comments on the Colorado water rights adjudications as follows:
Despite huge investments in monitoring and analysis, the technical issues
inherent in quantifying the volume of water available for appropriation in
interlinked groundwater and surface-water systems are not likely to be
resolved soon .... [F]undamental uncertainties regarding the hydro-
logical dynamics of regional systems make accurate quantification
impossible in many situations. The inherent technical challenges often
undermine the social and political acceptability of volumetric rights
systems-if we cannot prove ... that groundwater pumping is affecting
surface water rights, it is very difficult for courts or politicians to place
limits on new wells or the level of extraction from existing ones.52
The states of California53 and Texas54 also have bifurcated water laws and
have suffered similar ecological damage and management difficulties. Vested
rights to the use of water, if not based on hydrologic reality, will eventually result
in harm not only to the ecology, but to other rights as well.
The risk of a separate international instrument for aquifers lies in the lessons
learned from these states-too much time, money and effort is required to
distinguish aquifers from other waters if different rights accrue. This is said not
to minimize the global issues of groundwater extraction and aquifer protection,
but to caution against creating a separate legal regime for aquifers and the
groundwater therein.
Moving from the "water law" concepts of international law, the next section
looks briefly at issues related to fragmentation of international law that should be
considered in the examination of the Draft Articles.
51. For a discussion of the bifurcation in Texas water law, see Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep
Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249
(2001).
52. Moench, supra note 14, at 96.
53. For a discussion of California law, see Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater
Export Legislation in California: Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657 (1994).
54. Texas follows a rule of capture for groundwater use. "Under the capture rule, pumping is
unregulated and landowners are allowed to withdraw as much groundwater from beneath their land as they can
capture. In the exercise of this right there is no liability absent malice, waste, or subsidence." Kaiser & Skillern,
supra note 51, n. 10 (citing Sipriano v. Great Springs Water of Am., Inc., I S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. 1999); City of
Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest
Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 25-30 (Tex. 1978); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 294,
276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (1955); Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 148, 81 S.W. 279, 280
(1904)).
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2. Fragmentation of International Law5
The topic of the fragmentation of international law adds a different
perspective to the discussion of whether a second freshwater instrument should
be adopted. Fragmentation of international law was introduced in the ILC Study
Group report as follows:
The rationale for the Commission's treatment of fragmentation is that the
emergence of new and special types of law, 'self-contained regimes' and
geographically or functionally limited treaty-systems creates problems of
coherence in international law. New types of specialized law do not
emerge accidentally but seek to respond to new technical and functional
requirements .... Each rule-complex or 'regime' comes with its own
principles, its own form of expertise and its own 'ethos', not necessarily
identical to the ethos of neighbouring specialization.56
The litigation over the MOX Plant nuclear facility near Sellafield in the
United Kingdom highlights these issues. Koskenniemi describes the
fragmentation of international law in relation to this set of facts as follows:
The question of the possible environmental effects of the operation of the
'MOX Plant' nuclear facility ... has been raised at three different
institutions: an Arbitral Tribunal set up under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), another Tribunal under
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) and within the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) under the European Community and Euratom
Treaties. Three rule-complexes-the UNCLOS, the OSPAR Convention,
and EC law---each address the same facts. Which should be
determinative? is the problem principally about the law of the sea, about
(possible) pollution of the North Sea, or about inter-EC relationships? To
pose such questions already points to the difficulty of providing an
answer. Surely the case is about all of these matters? And yet, a choice
57has to be made between the institutions ....
55. The topic of the fragmentation of international law was the focus of a study group of the
International Law Commission chaired by Martii Koskenniemi. In 2006 the Study Group reported to the
General Assembly the "Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law." 2006 Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 1, 1 251; Martti Koskenniemi, Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission, 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter
Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682/Corr. 1].
56. Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1, supra note 55.
57. Koskenniemi, Fate of Public International Law, supra note 40, at 7.
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The UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal deferred making such a choice and pointed
out the difficulties of multiple legal regimes:
Considering also that the application of international law rules on
interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provision of different
treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia,
differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent
practice of parties and travaux preparatoires ....
The Draft Articles and the 1997 U.N. Convention contain many of the same
or similar provisions. However, these two documents were prepared at different
times by different members of the ILC, and both may apply to the same use of
water. In essence they may be separate instruments within the same "regime." Is
"equitable and reasonable utilization" of an aquifer 59 to be interpreted the same as
equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse? 60 Utilization
of an aquifer based on the Draft Articles includes Article 3, Sovereignty of
Aquifer States, which is not part of the 1997 U.N. Convention. Will this change
the principles or change the application of the principles?
One reason given for the fragmentation of international law is the
increasingly technical subject matters of concern to states ranging from trade to
communications to the global environment. In his Chorley Lecture delivered 7
June 2006, Koskenniemi suggested "that the problems faced by international law
today-marginalization, lack of normative force, a sense that the diplomatic
mores that stand at its heart are part of the world's problems-result in large part
from ... the effort of becoming technical.'
The Draft Articles and the 1997 U.N. Convention are technical. Freshwater
instruments that are based on equitable standards require technical experts to
provide the information necessary to balance the factors. The Draft Articles are
even more technical than the 1997 U.N. Convention, requiring knowledge and
expertise about aquifers as recharging or non-recharging before determining
which set of rules to apply. If a question arises in negotiations or within a dispute
as to which instrument to apply, the Draft Articles or the 1997 U.N. Convention,
should this be decided by hydrologic information that was previously unknown
by the parties?
As discussed above under the topic of bifurcation, freshwater is not easily
characterized. It can be identified as belonging to an aquifer and thereby
governed by an instrument specific to aquifers, or it can be characterized as an
international watercourse as defined by the 1997 U.N. Convention. Loures and
58. MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), 126 I.L.R. 273, 51 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001),
available at http://www.itlos.org/case-documents/2001/document-en 197.pdf.
59. 2006 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 4.
60. 1997 U.N. Convention, supra note 22, art. 5.
61. Koskenniemi, Fate of Public International Law, supra note 40, at 2.
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Delapenna discuss the difficulty of separating a naturally interconnected
hydrologic system into separate legal regimes, and conclude that the Draft
Articles should not become a second international freshwater instrument but
should take the form of a protocol to the 1997 U.N. Convention.62
In the commentary to the Draft Articles, the ILC acknowledged the difficulty
of overlapping instruments63 and deferred resolution by referencing the charge to
the Commission to codify the law on "shared natural resources" 6 stating:
[T]he present draft articles apply only to "transboundary" aquifers or
aquifer systems. All the transboundary aquifers and aquifer systems will
be governed by the present draft articles, regardless of whether they are
hydraulically connected to international watercourses .... [T]he
possibility that such groundwaters [those included in the 1997 UN
Convention] are also governed by the present draft articles could not be
completely disregarded. Accordingly, when the present draft articles
were to become a legally binding instrument, the need would arise to
determine the relationship between the present draft articles and the 1997
[UN] Convention.65
3. Aquifers or Groundwater
Koskenniemi maintains that within a fragmented system of international law
the characterization of a dispute as environmental, trade, or human rights,
determines the applicable legal regime which in turn determines the outcome of a
dispute. The author submits that the characterization of the topic before the ILC
as aquifers, not as groundwaters, influenced the approach taken by the ILC in
preparing the Draft Articles.
The definition of "aquifer" is "a permeable water-bearing geological
formation underlain by a less permeable layer and the water contained in the
saturated zone of the formation. 66 This definition, while scientifically correct,67 is
less than clear and raises legal questions. The geologic formation is static and
made up of the rock, soil, and underground "cavities." The water contained
therein is fluid and moves across boundaries in response to natural conditions and
human activities. The Draft Articles reflect this dichotomy. Draft Article 3
regarding Sovereignty is applicable to the geologic formation and not the water.
However, Draft Articles 4, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization, applies to the
water contained in the aquifer. Describing its scope in terms of "aquifers" not
62. Loures & Dellapenna, supra note 8.
63. 2008 Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 1, 91 39-45.
64. ld. 32.
65. Id. 9 54, art. I cmt..
66. id. art. 2(a).
67. See, e.g., Kerstin Mechlem, International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles of a
Transboundary Aquifers Convention, 12 AM. SOCY INT'L L. 18 (2008).
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"groundwaters" is not without consequence. This approach moves the
perspective of the Draft Articles away from the topic of freshwater -which is
"of vital importance for sustaining life, health and the integrity of
ecosystems'"68_to that of underground geologic formations.
The inclusion of the provisions on sovereignty over the aquifer may have
been influenced by this definitional structure and by the manner in which the ILC
took up the topic. The ILC took up the law of transboundary aquifers as part of
the topic of "Shared Natural Resources." The ILC Report to the General
Assembly states, "It was generally understood that this topic included
groundwaters, oil and natural gas, while some preferred to include also such
resources as migratory birds and animals on one hand and some others preferred
to limit it so as to deal solely with groundwaters on the other., 69 The ILC
Commentary to the Draft Articles goes on to state that the Special Rapporteur
"recognises that the work on transboundary groundwaters could affect any future
codification work by the Commission on oil and natural gas."70 This
characterization of groundwater as a similar resource to oil and natural gas for
purposes of determining the legal principles for "sharing" natural resources may
account for the decision to include Draft Article 3, Sovereignty of Aquifer States,
even though sovereignty is a discredited theory of international water law.'
Freshwater is not an economic good in the same sense as oil and natural gas.
Falkenmark makes the following observation about freshwaters as economic
goods:
[W]ater is vital to life for which there is no substitute, and there is no
alternative choice to water. The only choice is how to allocate water and
to find the most efficient way of using it. Water, then, is immeasurably
different from other economic goods. One cannot easily choose another
type of water without tapping the same resource. Water is not an
ordinary economic good: it is [sic] special economic good."
This does not mean that the law related to groundwater should be identical to
that of the 1997 U.N. Convention. Eckstein cautions against using a surface
water management regime for groundwaters, giving as an example the
68: Resolution on Confined Transboundarv Groundwater, in 1994 Report of the International Law
Commission, supra note 29, at 135.
69. 2006 Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 1, 76, gen. cmt.
70. Id. 76, art 2. In his fifth report, Special Rapporteur Yamada acknowledged that comments from
governments dealt with the differences between water, oil, and gas, but only after the text of the 2006 Draft
Articles was solidified. He noted that the 2006 Draft Articles would not form the basis of the ILC work on oil
and gas, but did not acknowledge that concerns over oil and gas may have influenced the Draft Articles. See
Chusei Yamada, Special Rapporteur, Fifth Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary Aquifers, U 4-
6, U.N. Doc. AICN.41591 (Feb. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Yamada, Fifth Report] for this discussion.
71. See infra Part IV.
72. Falkenmark & Rockstr6m, supra note 11.
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vulnerability of groundwaters to contamination because it does not cleanse itself
like surface waters. He says,
The applicability of surface water law to ground water resources must be
examined carefully, keeping in mind the similarities and differences of
surface and ground water, the relationship between the two resources,
and the science of water. This is especially important with regard to the
general principles related to the utilization, allocation, and management
of transboundary aquifers.73
These differences do not require a new international instrument. They are
easily accommodated within a determination of what is an equitable and
reasonable utilization of freshwater, what is sustainable, and what is required for
the prevention of significant harm. Earlier, in 1995, Eckstein argued that the
principles of the draft articles that became the 1997 U.N. Convention should
apply to groundwater resources.74 He stated:
The inclusion of transboundary groundwater within the legal regime
governing international water resources is a relatively recent concept in
the development of international water law. It is following, albeit slowly,
the acknowledgement by science that the two sources of water are
indissociable and interdependent such that the deterioration of one will
likely have serious consequences upon the other. The recognition of this
nexus by planners and policy makers is especially crucial in light of the
growing demands being placed on water resources globally.75
Given the increase in scientific understanding of aquifers and the inter-
connectedness within the hydrologic cycle since 1995, this earlier reasoning is
more supportive of a unified freshwater regime.
The ILC and international scholars should make an effort to focus on water
as an integrated hydrologic system and to reduce the fragmentation of
international water law and recall that the object of the Draft Articles is water.
The differences in management of groundwater and surface water may be
accommodated within one body of international water law, the 1997 U.N.
Convention.
The next section looks at Article 3, Sovereignty of aquifer states, a substantive
article within General Principles that was not included in the 1997 U.N. Convention.
73. Eckstein 2007, supra note 7, at 559-560.
74. Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater
Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
67 (1995) [hereinafter Eckstein 1995].
75. Id. at 98.
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IV. SOVEREIGNTY OVER AQUIFERS
"Sovereignty" is a politically charged word which changes the dynamics of
discussions and negotiations. This section discusses the addition of a General
Principle on sovereignty. It deconstructs Article 3 and the meaning of sovereignty
before reviewing the discredited theories of sovereignty over freshwater resources.
This is followed in Part V with a discussion of the legal dispute over use of the
Arkansas River, in which each side used theories of sovereignty to support
conflicting claims.
Draft Article 3 first appeared in the July 28, 2005 Report of the Working Group,
76without commentary or reference to the practices of states. Prior to this, Special
Rapporteur Yamada discussed "sovereignty" by reference to the General Assembly
Resolution 1803, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Yamada reported:
The need to have an explicit reference to General Assembly resolution 1803
(XVII) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the preamble to
the draft articles was advocated particularly by those delegations that are of
the opinion that water resources belong to the States in which they are
located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those States. The
Special Rapporteur recognizes the sensitivity of the question and is willing
to include such a reference in the preamble. However, in accordance with
the general practice of the Cormnission, he prefers to postpone the
formulation of the preamble until after the substantive draft articles have
been agreed upon and all factors to be incorporated in the preamble are
known. 7
Yamada discussed the sovereign equality of states and the sovereign rights of
states with the following statement as commentary to the Draft Article on equitable
and reasonable utilization:
States have sovereign rights over the natural resources located within their
jurisdiction and aquifer States are entitled to utilize aquifers and aquifer
systems within their territories. It is needless to say that such rights should
not be absolute and unlimited.78
The ILC reports and documentation do not include a discussion of the
practice of States that support inclusion of an article on the sovereignty of aquifer
States over groundwater. Similarly, those States submitting comments on this
76. Working Group on Shared Natural Resources, Report of the Working Group, 6, U. N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.681 (July 28, 2005).
77. Chusei Yamada, Special Rapporneur, Third Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary
Groundwaters, 4, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/551 (Fed. It, 2005) [hereinafter
Yamada, Third Report].
78. Id. 19.
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topic in 2005 in response to the ILC questionnaire did not assert sovereignty as a
general principle in the utilization of groundwater.79 Nevertheless, "Sovereignty
of aquifer States," the first article in Part II, General Principles, reads as follows:
Article 3
Sovereignty of Aquifer States
Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary
aquifer or aquifer system located within its territory. It shall exercise its
sovereignty in accordance with international law and the present draft
articles.8 0
The 2006 Draft Articles qualified the concept of sovereignty by stating that it
shall be "exercise[d] ... in accordance with the present draft articles,"8 ' which
include utilization of the aquifer "according to the principle of equitable and
reasonable utilization. 82 Eckstein maintains that the inclusion of Article 3 with
this qualifying language provides more limitations on utilization of an aquifer
than if Article 3 were not included.83 This paper, however, maintains that the
limitations in the second sentence are insufficient to temper the charge
"sovereignty" injects into a negotiation.
The Draft Articles as recommended to the General Assembly in 2008 have
been changed slightly from the earlier version. The second sentence in Article 3
now states that the exercise of sovereignty over a transboundary aquifer shall be
exercised in accordance with "international law" in addition to the present draft
articles.84 States are bound by customary international law, regardless of what is
included in this Draft Article. The addition of this phrase does not enhance
Article 3 and the Commentary makes the provision more confusing 5 with
references to general treaties and instruments dealing with air, biological
diversity, fish stocks and a host of other topics. However, the Commentary does
not address the theories of sovereignty over water resources or the previous work
of the ILC on this topic.
6
79. See U. N. GAOR, Shared Natural Resources: Comments and Observations Received from Govern-
ments and Relevant Intergovernmental Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41555. (April 29, 2005).
80. 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3.
81. 2006 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3
82. Id. art. 4.
83. Eckstein 2007, supra note 7, at 560-62.
84. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 1, art. 3.
85. See id. art. 3 cmt.
86. Compare the travaux prepartoire for the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers with
only one of the Reports on the Law of Preparatoire the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
Stephen M. Schwebel, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses. AICN.4/332 (Apr. 24, May 22, 1980). reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
159 [hereinafter Schwebel. Second Report].
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The 1997 U.N. Convention does not contain a corresponding provision on
sovereignty. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the addition of Article 3 bestows
additional rights on a State utilizing an aquifer under the Draft Articles than what are
available under the 1997 U.N. Convention. In order to examine possible implications
of Draft Article 3 regarding sovereignty over a portion of a transboundary aquifer,
this section examines the definition and use of the term sovereignty.
Black's Law Dictionary defines sovereignty by describing the independent
powers included in the concept of sovereignty: "The supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed .... By
"sovereignty" in its largest sense is meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power,
the absolute right to govern."87
"Sovereignty" distinguishes a self-governing area, that is recognized by other
States, from a territory of another State, a trusteeship or a "no-man's land."
Sovereignty is the recognition that a State is legitimate vis-a-vis other States and
private interests.
Thusly defined we have two concepts of sovereignty; first, a territory recognized
as a state within the international community of states and second, the exercise of the
highest governmental authority within that territory. Brownlie describes the two
concepts:
In spatial terms the law knows four types of regime: territorial sovereignty,
territory not subject to the sovereignty of any state or states and which
possesses a status of its own (trust territories, for example), the res nullius,
and the res communis. Territorial sovereignty extends principally over land
territory, the territorial sea appurtenant to the land, and the seabed and
subsoil of the territorial sea.89
The state territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial sea), together
with the government and population within its frontiers, comprise the physical and
social manifestations of the primary type of international legal person, the state. The
legal competence of states and the rules for their protection depend on and assume
the existence of a stable, physically delimited, homeland. The competence of states
in respect of their territory is usually described in terms of sovereignty and
jurisdiction .... '9
Sovereignty is also the concept that links the two aspects, fixing authority to a
place. Sovereignty is a "mappable understanding of authority's domain, namely,
territory."'
87. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
88. See KEN CONCA, GOVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND GLOBAL
INSTITUTION BUILDING 44 (MIT Press 2006).
89. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (Oxford University Press 7th ed.
2008) (1966).
90. Id.
91. CONCA, supra note 88, at 46.
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Draft Article 3 provides, "Each aquifer state has sovereignty over the portion
of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located within its territory." 92 This is
irrefutable if it applies to sovereignty over the rocks and soil that make up the
"geological formation [s]."93 If, however, Draft Article 3 means that states
exercise sovereignty over the transboundary (international) fresh water resources
contained within the "geological formation," this is contrary to international law,
which does not recognize sovereignty as a basis for the use of international
freshwaters.94
International freshwaters are not static; they do not stay within one territory
nor do they respect political boundaries. Even static water within a non-
recharging or confined aquifer flows in a cone of depression toward the point of
pumping. The constant movement of freshwater through the hydrologic cycle
makes water unsuitable for the application of legal concepts based on territory.
One possible interpretation of Draft Article 3 is that sovereignty is exercised over
a state's equitable and reasonable portion of the water within the aquifer. In other
words, State A holds a right to utilize an equitable share of an aquifer and uses its
sovereign authority to determine how and by whom that water is used. 95 This is
consistent with the language of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on the
Environment and Development:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
This interpretation is not consistent with the language of Article 3 that each
state has sovereignty over aquifers within its territory. The ILC Commentary
does not indicate that this is the preferred interpretation. However, sovereignty
and concepts of equitable utilization of a resource are inherently contradictory98
92. 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3
93. Id. art. 2(a).
94. See Schwebel, Second Report, supra note 86; STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES ch. 5 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2007).
95. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 108-109 (1938) reh'g
denied, 305 U.S. 668 (1938) (proposing that a state may exercise authority only over so much water as is
permitted to be used within the state according to an equitable apportionment contained in an interstate
compact).
96. U.N. GAOR, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on the Environment and Development, A/CONF.151126 (Vol. I) (June 3-14, 1992) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl5 l/aconfl 5126- 1 annex I.htm.
97. See 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3 cmt.
98. CONCA, supra note 88, at 119 (express provisions affirming a state's sovereign rights may be in
response to "the emergence of 'trans-sovereign' norms stressing the responsibilities as well as rights of states in
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unless the principle of sovereignty is limited in its exercise to a State's equitable
portion of the water resources within an aquifer. 99
Equitable utilization of water resources includes a temporal element., °° What
is equitable today may not be equitable next year or into the next decade because
the resource available for utilization has changed and because the human
interaction with the resource changes. The water within "the portion of a
transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located within [a State's] territory"'' is
also constantly changing and will continue to change as water is withdrawn from
one side, and then the other side, of a border. Sovereignty over a resource is a
static state that does not incorporate this temporal aspect.
Sovereignty is also a territorial concept that is inapplicable to international
freshwaters. The next section summarizes the historical legal theories of
sovereignty over water resources that have been asserted and repudiated.
A. Theories of Sovereignty Over Fresh Waters
The Commentary to the Draft Articles does not reference the historical
theories of sovereignty over water resources '°2 or the previous work of the ILC on
this topic in preparation of the 1997 U.N. Convention.' 3 The United States
Supreme Court, the International Law Commission, and scholars of domestic and
international water law have thoroughly examined and repudiated the theories of
sovereignty over freshwaters.i °4
In his book on the law of international watercourses, ° Stephen McCaffrey
traces the development of the legal theories of sovereignty over international
watercourses. '°6 The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty was historically
asserted by upstream states and is reflected in the "Harmon Doctrine" most
notably set forth by an attorney general for the United States during negotiations
with Mexico over the Rio Grande. The doctrine provides that an upstream state
may utilize a transboundary watercourse within its territory without consideration
of the consequences downstream.' 7 It is a theory based on international
independence and an expression of the absolute sovereign powers within a state's
territory.
The opposite theory, asserted by downstream states, is that of absolute territorial
integrity. While not using the word "sovereignty" in its label, it is based in principles
shared basins").
99. See id.
100. MCCAFFREY,supra note 94, at 388.
101. 2008 Draft Articles, supra note I, art. 3.
102. See 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3 cmt.; 2006 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3 cmt.
103. See Schwebel, Second Report, supra note 86.
104. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 94, ch. 5.
105. Id. Stephen C. McCaffrey served as Special Rapporteur on this topic from 1985 to 1991.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 77.
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of absolute dominion and power within a state's territory and the maxim sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas (so use your own as not to harm that of another).'08 Absolute
territorial integrity entitles a state to receive the full flow of a watercourse
undiminished by upstream uses. McCaffrey again references the work of a United
States advisor to an international controversy as articulating this theory: "It is a
fundamental principle of the law of nations that a sovereign state is supreme within
its own territorial domain and that it and its nationals are entitled to use and enjoy
their territory and property without interference from an outside source."' 9 The
practical problem with this theory is that if applied to all States that are riparian to an
international watercourse, only the State farthest downstream is entitled to utilize the
watercourse.
McCaffrey concludes the discussion of these two theories as follows:
History has been no kinder to the doctrine of absolute territorial integrity
than to its theoretical opposite absolute territorial sovereignty. Both
doctrines are, in essence, factually myopic and legally 'anarchic': they
ignore other states' need for and reliance on the waters of an international
watercourse, and they deny that sovereignty entails duties as well as rights.
As freshwater becomes increasingly precious and nations of the world ever
more interdependent, both doctrines become increasingly less relevant and
defensible."
McCaffrey goes on to trace the limitations of sovereignty in relation to waters
including the following quote from Oppenheim's 1905 treatise on international law.
[T]erritorial supremacy does not give a boundless liberty of action. Thus, by
customary International Law... a State is, in spite of its territorial
supremacy, not allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to
the disadvantage of the natural conditions of a territory of a neighbouring
state-for instance, to stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its
own into a neighbouring territory."'
The Commentary to Draft Article 3'12 indicates that many states advocated
including Article 3"3 and/or referencing the 1962 General Assembly resolution
108. See id. ch. II (discussing in general the no-harm principle based in part on the principle of sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas).
109. Id. at 127 (quoting Green H. Hackworth, Memorandum in Relation to the Arbitration of the Trail
Smelter Case, 5 WHITEMAN 183 (Aug. 10, 1937)).
110. Id. at 133 (internal citations removed).
111. Id. at 391 (quoting OPPENHEIM 175 (1st ed. 1905)).
112. 2006 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3 cmt.
113. Id.; see also International Law Commission, Shared Natural Resources: Comments and
Observations by Governments on the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, A/CN.4/595 (March
26, 2008); Yamada, Fifth Report, supra note 70.
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1803, "Permanent sovereignty over natural resources."" 4 Since 1962 international
law has developed limitations on the exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources, requiring states to respect the natural environment beyond their
territorial limits."5 The law recognizes that utilization of transboundary resources
impacts all states that share the same resource.
Eckstein, in his Commentary on the Draft Articles, indicated that Article 3
was added to dispel "the notion that ground water resources might be subject to a
common heritage of humankind.""' 6 This concern is not expressed by the official
commentary prepared by the ILC. However, it would appear that this concern is
alleviated by a discussion of the inapplicability of this concept to freshwater and
aquifers. First, the concept of a "common heritage of mankind" is not a principle
of international law, but has been described as no more than "a philosophical
notion.""' 7 Second, the precepts of this "notion" are not applicable to
transboundary aquifers. The "common heritage of humankind" applies to
unappropriated global common spaces such as outer space and the deep sea beds.
Aquifers are not unappropriated global common spaces. They are regional
resources utilized by the overlying states. In many instances the legal issue to be
addressed by the law of transboundary freshwaters is not the preservation of an
unappropriated global commons, but the over-appropriation by local interests.
Eckstein indicates that Draft Article 3 explicitly limits absolute sovereignty
by making sovereignty exercisable only in accordance with the Draft Articles,"8
which include the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and the
prevention of significant harm."9 This is one interpretation. It is equally plausible
that States will consider Draft Article 3 to be an explicit "recognition" of
sovereignty over aquifers, and that the equitable and reasonable utilization of
aquifers is in some way different from utilization of surface waters.
Considering that the 1997 U.N. Convention on the law of non-navigational
uses of international watercourses does not include a provision on sovereignty,
the question becomes: What does the addition of Article 3 mean? It cannot be
determined that it is a codification of customary international law without
114. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962). A thorough discussion of this Resolution is beyond the
scope of this article; however that this Resolution passed at the end of the colonial era is a recognition that
governmental control over the natural resources within a territory is an attribute of sovereignty and within state
authority. Transboundary freshwaters do not conform to these territorial limitations and create special
circumstances not covered by this more general statement on sovereignty.
115. See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 189-90
(Transnational Publishers 3d ed. 2004) (discussing the development of the environmental principles limiting
sovereignty).
116. Eckstein 2007, supra note 7, at 561.
117. Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 35
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 190, 199 (1986).
118. Eckstein 2007, supra note 7, at 561.
119. The 2008 Draft Articles as recommended to the General Assembly added that sovereignty be
exercised in accordance with "international law." 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 3.
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documentation of this custom and opinio juris.'20 Is it the progressive
development of international law?'2 ' This question is particularly pertinent
recalling that the scope of the Draft Articles overlaps the scope of the 1997 U.N.
Convention. Both potentially apply to the same waters, and leave an impression
that the later Draft Articles are the more progressive instrument.
McCaffrey characterizes the addition of Article 3, Sovereignty of Aquifer
States, and the placement of this article in such a prominent position as
"unhelpful" at best. 1 2 As the stress on freshwater resources increases, integrated
and transboundary management of these resources becomes more important. To
be effective, management must move beyond the boundaries of sovereignty for
even those water resources which are considered domestic and wholly within one
state. If any of these freshwaters are mismanaged, polluted, or depleted, there
will be international consequences.1
23
Negotiations over transboundary freshwaters that use the framework
established by the 1997 U.N. Convention start with a common understanding of
the law based on three principles: equitable and reasonable utilization, prevention
of significant harm and prior notification of planned measures. Negotiations
among states over utilization of transboundary aquifers based on the Draft
Articles may start with the assertion of sovereignty over that portion of the
aquifer underlying each state's territory. To use McCaffrey's term, this is
"unhelpful" to promote cooperation over shared transboundary water resources.
The politically charged concept of sovereignty is illustrated in the history of
disputes between the states of Colorado and Kansas over the Arkansas River.
V. ARKANSAS RIVER DISPUTES
In what seems like a comment on today's global water situation, Justice
Brewer of the United States Supreme Court described the dispute between the
states of Kansas and Colorado over use of the Arkansas River more than one
hundred years ago as follows:
Controversies between the States are becoming frequent, and in the rapidly
changing conditions of life and business are likely to become still more so.
Involving as they do the rights of political communities, which in many respects
are sovereign and independent, they present not infrequently questions of far-
reaching import and of exceeding difficulty.
24
120. Eckstein 2007, supra note 7, at 561.
121. G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947), amended by G.A. Res. 485 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950), G.A. Res. 984
(X) (Dec. 3, 1955), G.A. Res. 985 (X) (Dec. 3, 1955), G.A. Res. 36/39, art. I (Nov. 18, 1981).
122. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 94, at 502.
123. See CONCA, supra note 88, at 169.
124. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 80 (1907).
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In Kansas v. Colorado,25 the U.S. Supreme Court defined the principle of
equitable apportionment which formed the basis of the international doctrine of
equitable utilization.126 The Arkansas River disputes between the upstream state
of Colorado and the downstream state of Kansas are examples not atypical of
transboundary water disputes. The downstream state was the first to develop and
cried foul when the upstream state starting using the watercourse. Each state
claimed sovereignty over the waters. The United States Supreme Court resolved
the competing claims of sovereignty with the first articulation of the principle of
equitable apportionment. 27 After decades of litigation, the two states reached a
compromise agreement memorialized in an interstate compact, which held off
further litigation until groundwater use upstream increased such that it impacted
downstream uses and the two states returned to court to determine the scope of
the compact in relation to groundwater.
The Arkansas River originates in the Rocky Mountains in the state of
Colorado. It flows southeasterly for approximately 280 miles (450 km) until it
crosses into the state of Kansas where it flows for 300 miles (482 km) to the
border with the state of Oklahoma. It then flows through Oklahoma and into the
state of Arkansas where it joins the Mississippi River, which empties into the
Gulf of Mexico. The Arkansas River is fed at its headwaters by snowmelt which
creates a torrential river in the spring and summer. It becomes a slow meandering
watercourse in Kansas with few tributaries. Throughout Kansas the river flows
through a broad and deep alluvial valley.
28
In 1902, the time of the first dispute between Kansas and Colorado,' 29 both
states were young13 and competing for wealth from their resources. The
downstream portion of the Arkansas River Valley was settled in Kansas with the
river used for agriculture development, power production, manufacturing and
milling. In Kansas, the Arkansas River flows within the banks of the river as
surface water and through the alluvial deposits in the valley. Water allocation
within the state of Kansas is based on riparian rights to the usual and normal flow
of the river "as it was accustomed to run." ' 31 In 1902, Kansas alleged that the
usual and normal flow was being diminished by new uses within Colorado.
125. Id.
126. MCCAFFREY, supra note 94, at 384. "Born of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
interstate apportionment cases beginning in the early twentieth century, and supported by decisions in other
federal states, the doctrine of equitable utilization" was used in the 1966 Helsinki Rules, confirmed by the
International Court of Justice in the Case concerning the Gabctkovo-Nagymaros Project as the 'overarching
principle governing the use of international watercourses' .... " Id. at 384-385 (citations omitted).
127. Kansas, 206 U.S. at 118.
128. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 126-29 (1902).
129. Kansas, 185 U.S. 125.
130. Kansas was admitted as a state in the union of the United States January 29, 1861 and Colorado
was admitted on August 1, 1876. Kansas, 206 U.S. at 50.
131. Id. at 60.
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Colorado is one of several states in the western United States that are arid or
semi-arid and follow the law of prior appropriation of surface waters. The law of
prior appropriation gives the first person who puts the water to beneficial use the
prior, and superior, right to continue that use. This system of water law creates a
ranking of users giving the "first in time" priority over those "later in time"
during times of water shortage. At the turn of the twentieth century, diversion
projects in Colorado were being built in order to "reclaim" non-riparian lands and
convert "arid and uninhabited wastes into populous districts with productive
farms and thriving towns and industries.'
32
Both Kansas and Colorado had strong interests in protecting their economic
base, the livelihood of their citizens, and their own rule of law over water
resources. Both states asserted sovereignty over the water of the Arkansas River.
Colorado, the upstream state, asserted the sovereign right "to appropriate all the
waters of this stream for the purposes of irrigating its soil and making more
valuable its own territory.""'3 This embodied a position of "absolute territorial
sovereignty," or the Harmon Doctrine. Kansas, the downstream state following
riparian law, asserted "that the flowing water in the Arkansas must.., be left to
flow as it was wont to flow, no portion of it being appropriated in Colorado for
the purposes of irrigation .... Thus Kansas' position was one of "absolute
territorial integrity." The Supreme Court rebuked each of these claims of
sovereignty characterizing each state's legal position as "extreme."' 35 The Court
stated that "[i]f the two States were absolutely independent nations [this dispute]
would be settled by treaty or by force.'
36
The Court transformed the assertions of state sovereignty over the resource
by acknowledging the quasi-sovereign status of each state recognizing their
''sovereign equality" and then characterizing the assertions of sovereignty over
the water resource as matters of state jurisdiction.'37 The Court determined that
"each state has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the
beds of streams and other waters,"'38 and that each state "may determine for itself
whether the common-law rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which
obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of waters for the
purposes of irrigation [the doctrine of prior appropriation] shall control.' 39
However, the Court determined that neither state had sovereignty over the water
to the exclusion of the other.
132. Id. at 62-63.
133. Id. at 98.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 100.
138. Id. at 93 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 94.
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To resolve the dispute the Court examined the benefit to Colorado resulting
from appropriation of waters from the Arkansas River balanced against the harm
to Kansas resulting from not receiving the full flow. The Court acknowledged
harm to individual interests in Kansas, but did not find that the harm to the state
was sufficient to counter the great benefits that were accruing to Colorado from
the irrigation of arid lands. "We must consider the effect of what has been done
upon the conditions in the respective states and so adjust the dispute upon the
basis of equality of rights as to secure as far as possible to Colorado the benefits
of irrigation without depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing
stream."'
40
The action by Kansas against Colorado was dismissed without prejudice "to
institute new proceedings whenever it shall appear that through a material
increase in the depletion of the waters of the Arkansas [River] by Colorado, its
corporations or citizens, the substantial interests of Kansas are being injured to
the extent of destroying the equitable apportionment of benefits between the two
states resulting from the flow of the river."'' 4' This did not take long. Three years
after the Court dismissed the case, a private ditch company in Kansas sued water
users in Colorado seeking an adjudication of relative rights. 42 This was followed
by numerous lawsuits by private entities in Kansas against Colorado water users
until 1928, when Colorado sued Kansas seeking an injunction against further
private lawsuits. In response, Kansas asked the Court to make a volumetric
apportionment of the waters of the Arkansas River. The Special Master appointed
by the Supreme Court to take evidence made such an apportionment, but the
Court did not accept the Special Master Report. In rejecting the apportionment,
the Court stated:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of states
in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they
involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and
delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of
conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial
imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may appropriately
be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact
clause of the Federal constitution.
43
In 1943, the Court enjoined the entities in Kansas from continuing to sue
water users in Colorado and encouraged the states to negotiate an agreement
140. id. at 100.
141. Id. at H17-18.
142. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 386-388 (1943), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 803 (Mar. 6, 1944)
(discussing, but not citing, litigation that commenced on August 27, 1910, brought by the United States
Irrigating Company against the Graham Ditch Company to determine the priorities of Kansas and Colorado
water users).
143. Id. at 392.
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based on an equitable apportionment of benefits. The next section discusses that
agreement.
A. Arkansas River Compact'44
Kansas and Colorado proceeded to negotiate the Arkansas River Compact,
which was concluded in 1948 and approved by the United States Congress in
1949. The provisions of import for this discussion are Article III defining the
scope of the compact, Article IV(D) regarding future development, and Article
VI(A) regarding reservation of rights to each state. The discussion starts with the
latter.
Colorado and Kansas both asserted sovereign rights to the water of the
Arkansas River, which were repudiated by the United States Supreme Court. In
the Compact both states preserved those aspects of sovereignty accepted by the
Court in a way most important to each, while clarifying the extent of rights
withheld and granted.
Kansas placed its focus on state jurisdiction with the following provision:
Nothing in this Compact shall be construed as impairing the jurisdiction of
Kansas over the waters of the Arkansas river that originate in Kansas and over
the waters that flow from Colorado across the state line into Kansas.
'
41
Colorado focused on administration of water rights with this provision:
Except as otherwise provided, nothing in this Compact shall be construed
as supplanting the administration by Colorado of the rights of
appropriators of waters of the Arkansas river in said state as decreed to
said appropriators by the courts of Colorado, nor as interfering with the
distribution among said appropriators by Colorado, nor as curtailing the
diversion and use for irrigation and other beneficial purposes in Colorado
of the waters of the Arkansas river. 
46
The scope of the Arkansas River Compact is determined by the description
of the waters that are included. The Compact provides that a major purpose is to
"[e]quitably divide and apportion... the waters of the Arkansas river and their
utilization,"'' 47 defining "waters of the Arkansas river" as "the waters originating
in the natural drainage basin of the Arkansas river, including its tributaries
.... ,,148 "River flow" is defined as "the sum of the flows of the Arkansas and the
Purgatoire rivers into John Martin Reservoir as determined by gaging [sic]
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-520 (2008).
145. Id. art. VI(A)(1).
146. Id. art. VI(A)(2).
147. Id. art. I(B).
148. Id. art. HI(B).
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stations .... 1' The Compact does not further define its scope as to groundwater
or surface waters within the drainage basin. Farmers in Kansas divert water from
the surface flow and also withdraw water with pumps in the alluvial basin, all of
which is considered "waters of the Arkansas river." Appropriators in Colorado
also divert directly from the surface watercourse and with pumps.
Article IV(D) discusses future development providing that:
This compact is not intended to impede or prevent future beneficial
development of the Arkansas river basin in Colorado and Kansas...
which may involve construction of dams, reservoirs and other works for
the purposes of water utilization and control, as well as the improved or
prolonged functioning of existing works: Provided, that the waters of the
Arkansas river ... shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or
availability .... "0
The Compact apportionment is based on measurements of inflow and
outflow at John Martin Reservoir. It does not include volumetric allocations to
either state. In the 1990's, Kansas sued Colorado asserting that the increased
pumping of "groundwater" in Colorado "materially depleted" the usable quantity
of the Arkansas River available in Kansas. The Court appointed a Special Master
who took extensive evidence on the impact of groundwater withdrawals in
Colorado. The Special Master concluded that since wells were in existence at the
time the states entered the Compact, some groundwater pumping was
permissible. Users in Colorado subsequently increased the capacity of the wells,
thereby increasing the amount of water withdrawn. Therefore, the Special Master
concluded that the increased pumping violated Article IV(D) of the Compact.
Colorado was thereafter enjoined from withdrawing more than the amount
withdrawn in 1948 when the Arkansas River Compact was entered.
This 1995 litigation is of note for our discussion because of what the Court
did not do. There was no distinction made between groundwater and surface
water based on the point of withdrawal because Article Ill(B) of the Compact
included "the waters originating in the natural drainage basin of the Arkansas
River" without a distinction between groundwater and surface water."' By so
defining the scope of the Compact, the parties avoided costly and difficult
attempts to define boundaries of the watercourse and of aquifers within the basin.
The Special Master and the Court examined impacts of water use, and enjoined
the uses in violation of the Compact.
5 2
149. Id. art. III(H).
150. Id. art. IV(D).
151. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995).
152. Id. at 694.
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B. Lessons Learned From the Arkansas River Disputes
This foray to the Arkansas River is intended to remind us of the difficulties
of resolving transboundary water disputes, which are a complex combination of
politics, changing natural conditions, and technical evaluations. Below is a
summary of some of the lessons to be drawn from this century-old dispute.
First, sovereignty over freshwater resources is repudiated. In 1907, the Court
rejected both the theories of absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute
territorial integrity over transboundary waters. However, even a decision from
the Supreme Court of the United States did not end the political attraction to
assert sovereignty over freshwater against other states. In 1922, Colorado again
asserted absolute territorial sovereignty, this time over the waters of the Laramie
River that originates in Colorado and flows into the state of Wyoming. Fifteen
years after the Supreme Court rebuked Colorado in the Kansas v. Colorado
decision, Colorado stated in its pleadings before the Supreme Court "that it is the
right of Colorado as a state to dispose, as she may choose, of any part or all of the
waters flowing in the portion of the river within her borders, 'regardless of the
prejudice that it may work' to Wyoming and her citizens . . . .""' The United
States Supreme Court, citing its decision in Kansas v. Colorado,54 held that
"[t]he contention of Colorado that she as a state rightfully may divert and use, as
she may choose, the waters flowing within her boundaries in this interstate
stream, regardless of any prejudice that this may work to others having rights in
the stream below her boundary, cannot be maintained."'55
Second, each state utilizes a transboundary river on the basis of the sovereign
equality of states. No state has a greater claim to the utilization of the water than
any other state.
Third, each state has the sovereign right to use a transboundary watercourse
and the sovereign authority, or jurisdiction, to regulate water use within its
territory, but this does not give any state a right to utilize more than its equitable
apportionment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court established the legal standard for
utilization of a United States transboundary watercourse in 1907, which
subsequently influenced the development of international law. Based on the
sovereign equality of states, each watercourse state may share in the equitable
153. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 457 (1922).
154. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 46 (1907).
155. Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 466 (citing Kansas, 206 U.S. 46). The Court went on to discuss the fact that
both states followed the law of prior appropriation and that both developed under the public land laws of the
United States, thereby concluding that the "just and equitable" means of determining an apportionment of water
between the two states is to apply the doctrine of prior appropriation without regard to the state line. See id. at
470-496.
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apportionment of benefits so long as the uses in one state do not substantially
injure another state.
The drafters of the 1997 U.N. Convention relied on this case. 5 6 Article 8
Section lof the 1997 U.N. Convention incorporates the principles of sovereign
equality; Article 5 incorporates the concept of "benefits" from the watercourse
that are to be shared equitably; and Article 6 sets forth factors and circumstances
for consideration of equitable and reasonable utilization. It is time for the
political pull to assert sovereignty over freshwater resources to end. Sovereignty
as a theory of water law was repudiated more than 100 years ago and rejected in
the 1997 U.N. Convention.
Moving forward, the overriding natural facts of the hydrologic cycle cannot
be ignored in the law. International law should not bifurcate the hydrologic cycle
with separate instruments for aquifers and watercourses. This makes integrated
water management extremely difficult. Those jurisdictions that have bifurcated
laws offer little protection to ecosystems caught between the definitions of
surface water and groundwater and do not permit integrated utilization for
optimal benefits.
The 1997 U.N. Convention is a framework convention that incorporates
integrated basin-wide management, including groundwater. It is based on
principles of equity and reasonableness. What impact will a second international
instrument governing freshwater have on the effort to protect and preserve
freshwater resources? That is difficult to predict. However, the efforts to obtain a
global regime for the law of freshwaters will slow as states, scholars, and
commentators wrangle with competing instruments.
In 1966 the International Law Association (ILA) adopted the Helsinki Rules,
the scope of which included the international drainage basin. The international
drainage basin was defined as a "system of waters, including surface and
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."'57 The ILA addressed
transboundary groundwaters not included within this definition at the 1986 Seoul
Conference. The "Seoul Rules" provide that the Helsinki Rules apply to an
aquifer intersected by two or more states even if that aquifer does not fit within
the Helsinki Rules' definition of an international drainage basin. Additional
articles of this four article document provide for the protection of groundwater,'58
and the integrated management of groundwater and surface waters.'59 The ILC
used this same approach and in 1994 adopted the Resolution on Confined
156. See Schwebel, Third Report, supra note 9, 45, n.87; see also McCaffrey, Second Report, supra
note 9, n.315.
157. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Report of the Fifty-Second
Conference, 484, art. II (Int'l Law Ass'n 1966). The Helsinki Rules were revised in 2004 by the Berlin Rules
which are available as the Final Conference Report 2004 at http://www.ila-hq.org/enlcommittees/index.
cfmlcid/32.
158. International Law Association, Water Resources Law Committee Report, in ILA SEOUL REPORT, at
251, art. 3 (Aug. 24-30, 1986).
159. Id. art. 4.
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Transboundary Groundwaters,' 60 stating that the principles of the 1997 U.N.
Convention should apply to all freshwaters. If this Resolution is approved as a
Protocol, the law of international freshwaters would be complete.
If the ILC continues to develop a second freshwater instrument, Loures and
Dellapenna advocate that the Draft Articles be revised to become a Protocol to
the 1997 U.N. Convention. 61 This paper agrees that this would be a good first
step. The ILA process outlined above for adoption of the Seoul Rules provides a
precedent.
This paper has further argued that Draft Article 3 should be deleted or
transformed in the way the United States Supreme Court transformed the
sovereignty arguments in Kansas v. Colorado. Draft Article 3 should recognize
the sovereign equality of each state and the sovereign right of each state to assert
jurisdiction over and regulate the use of its equitable share of the water contained
in transboundary aquifers.
As a final note, groundwater has been described as the world's savings
account, 62 not visible or readily accessible, but available for our use when we do
not have rainy days. In order to protect our savings, we need to recognize the
management obstacles that inherently arise when hydrologic realities are ignored
and bifurcated water laws are created. We must continue to build on scientific
facts, and strive to maintain a sufficient balance in our savings account.
160. 1994 Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 29, at 135.
161. See Loures & Dellapenna, supra note 8.
162. Weber, supra note 53, at 658.

